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INTRODUCTION 
Some issues of federal jurisdiction are well settled.  For instance, 
courts and scholars readily agree that federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction.
1




Other issues, however, are not so settled.  When federal courts must 
exercise the jurisdiction granted to them is one such issue without nearly 
as much consensus.  The Supreme Court has adopted various abstention 
doctrines that allow federal courts to choose not to exercise their 
jurisdiction.
3
  The Court has, for instance, granted federal courts wide 
discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in cases seeking declaratory 
relief, a doctrine known as the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine, named for the 
two cases on which it is based: Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of 
America
4
 and Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.
5
  The Court has permitted courts 
far more limited discretion to decline to hear cases involving claims for 
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 1.  See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.  They possess only that power authorized by Constitution 
and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” (internal citations omitted)); Matthew J. 
Richardson, Clarifying and Limiting Fraudulent Joinder, 58 FLA. L. REV. 119, 165 (2006) (“It is 
axiomatic that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Means v. Stocker, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1048–49 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (“Absent 
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court has no authority to rule on the merits of the claim.” (citing Bell 
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946); Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 
269 (6th Cir. 1990))). 
 3.  See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1049–151 
(6th ed. 2009) (discussing various abstention doctrines). 
 4.  Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942). 
 5.  Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995). 




 permitting abstention only in “exceptional 
circumstances.”
7
  But which standard applies when a complaint seeks 
both types of relief—that is, in a mixed-complaint case? 
This question of mixed-complaint cases typically arises in the same 
type of scenario: A case is pending in a state court, and a litigant in that 
case (presumably the defendant) files another case in a federal court, 
based on similar—or even identical—issues as those in the already-
pending state court case.  In this new suit, the litigant (now the plaintiff) 
seeks both declaratory and nondeclaratory relief.  The defendant in the 
new case then asks the court to refrain from deciding that case, based on 
the earlier-filed case.  The court must then decide what standard—
Colorado River or Brillhart/Wilton—it will apply. 
Deciding what standard applies is a “thorny question”
8
 on which 
federal courts have taken vastly different approaches.
9
  The eight circuits 
that have answered this question are hopelessly divided, having offered 
four distinct approaches.  Four circuits
10
 have held that courts have little 
                                                          
 6.  Nondeclaratory relief includes any type of relief other than a declaratory judgment, most 
commonly money damages or an injunction. 
 7.  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (quoting 
Cty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959)). 
 8.  Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rolison, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1236 (S.D. Ala. 2006). 
 9.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Physicians Grp. of Sarasota, L.L.C., 9 F. Supp. 
3d 1303, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (“Circuits are split as to whether the Brillhart doctrine can be 
applied when a plaintiff requests mixed forms of relief including a declaratory judgment . . . .”); 
Mass. Biologic Labs. of the Univ. of Mass. v. MedImmune, LLC, 871 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33–35 (D. 
Mass. 2012) (surveying this circuit split); Circuit Review Staff, Current Circuit Splits, 6 SETON 
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 135, 144 (2009) (recognizing the further circuit split over the application of 
abstention doctrines to mixed complaints caused by R.R. Street & Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 
F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
  Courts often refer to Brillhart/Wilton as a type of abstention doctrine, but as the Seventh 
Circuit has astutely observed, that term is not necessarily the best description of the doctrine.  
Typically, abstention “refers to a group of judicially-created doctrines.  The decision to stay an 
action under the Declaratory Judgment Act does not require the court to reach for a judicially-
created abstention doctrine.  Rather, the Act itself provides the district court with the necessary 
discretion.”  Med. Assurance Co. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2010).  Nevertheless, this 
Article does not concern itself with any definitional disputes, as any such disputes are irrelevant in 
this Article’s focus on a particular question on the relationship between Brillhart/Wilton and various 
abstention doctrines. 
 10.  See vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, 781 F.3d 731, 735–36 (4th Cir. 2015); Vill. of Westfield v. 
Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1999); Southwind Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen Aviation, Inc., 23 
F.3d 948, 950–51 (5th Cir. 1994); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 982 F.2d 437, 440–41 
(10th Cir. 1992). 
  The Fourth Circuit recently adopted this position.  See vonRosenberg, 781 F.3d at 735–36.  
Arguably, the presence of claims subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction impacted the court’s 
analysis in that case, although the court did not expressly state that those claims influenced its 
reasoning.  Thus, this Article assumes that the claims for nondeclaratory relief that were required to 
be brought in federal court were not essential to the Fourth Circuit’s holding.  See infra note 163 and 
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discretion to abstain in these cases, as they must apply Colorado River’s 
“exceptional circumstances” doctrine to the entire case.  Two circuits
11
 
have directed district courts to determine whether the claims for 
nondeclaratory relief are jurisdictionally independent of the claims for 
declaratory relief, and if those claims for nondeclaratory relief are 
independent, then the Colorado River doctrine applies.  Third, one 
circuit
12
 has instructed district courts to look to the heart of the 
complaint, and if the complaint at its core seeks declaratory relief, then 
Brillhart/Wilton applies.  And finally, one circuit
13
 has taken the view 
that the claims should be disentangled, with the claims for 
nondeclaratory relief being subject to Colorado River and the claims for 
declaratory relief being evaluated under Brillhart/Wilton.  Given these 
conflicting approaches, one district court has commented that this 




These four approaches represent starkly different answers to the 
question of abstention and mixed complaints.  They are not, however, 
equally satisfactory answers.  Of these approaches, the heart of the 
complaint approach is superior because it best balances four important 
considerations: first, preserving the unique language in the Declaratory 
Judgment Act; second, promoting the wise use of judicial resources; 
third, preventing parties from manipulating litigation; and fourth, 
providing courts the needed flexibility for reaching the correct result. 
Beyond the intellectually engaging questions presented, this circuit 
split raises an important and timely issue for the practice of law.  As 
Americans become more litigious generally,
15
 more complaints will be 
filed, and as lawyers get more creative in pleading cases, courts are more 
likely to see complaints that involve claims for both declaratory and 
nondeclaratory relief.  Despite this circuit split, scholars have given 
virtually no attention to this issue.
16
  In fact, some legal scholarship even 
                                                          
accompanying text. 
 11.  R.R. Street & Co., 569 F.3d at 716; United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 
1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 12.  Royal Indem. Co. v. Apex Oil Co., 511 F.3d 788, 793–94 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 13.  Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34–38 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 14.  Columbia Gas of Pa. v. Am. Int’l Grp., No. 10-1131, 2011 WL 294520, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 27, 2011). 
 15.  See Wm. Grayson Lambert, Toward A Better Understanding of Ripeness and Free Speech 
Claims, 65 S.C. L. REV. 411, 412 n.3 (2013) (collecting sources discussing rising caseloads). 
 16.  The only scholarship that addresses this issue directly is Tyler A. Mamone, Comment, No 
Simple Compromise: Reconciling Duty and Discretion Under Colorado River Abstention in Claims 
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seems unaware of the circuit split.
17
  Notwithstanding the lack of 
meaningful attention from legal scholars, as these cases become more 
common, the more likely the Supreme Court is to grant certiorari on this 
issue.  The resolution to the circuit split offered in this Article provides a 
suggested approach for the Court when it confronts this issue and for 
lower courts until the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split.
18
 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I sets out the 
Brillhart/Wilton doctrine, beginning with the adoption of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act and continuing through the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Brillhart in 1942 and in Wilton over half a century later.  Part II then 
presents the circuit split that has developed over what abstention rules 
apply to mixed complaints.  Finally, Part III explains why the heart of the 
complaint rule is the best approach. 
I. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT AND THE BRILLHART/WILTON 
DOCTRINE 
This Part sets the foundation for examining how the Brillhart/Wilton 
doctrine applies to mixed complaints.  It first discusses the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, describing its adoption and its language before then 
examining in depth Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., the circuit split 
that developed after the Court decided Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States,
19
 and the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of that circuit split in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. 
A. The Declaratory Judgment Act 
As early as 1918, scholars such as Professor Edwin Borchard at Yale 
Law School advocated for the adoption of declaratory judgments as a 
potential remedy “to afford security and relief against uncertainty and 
                                                          
for Mixed Relief, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 347 (2014).  As discussed later in this Article, the proposal in 
that article does not offer the best solution to the circuit split. 
 17.  See, e.g., Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal 
Court Intervention, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 1152 (1998) (stating simply that Brillhart/Wilton 
was inapplicable because the plaintiff in a case also sought declaratory relief, with no recognition 
that federal courts of appeal are sharply divided on this issue). 
 18.  This Article does not attempt to survey all cases in which these various approaches have 
been applied.  Indeed, I have no need to do so, as that task has already been aptly accomplished.  See 
generally Eric C. Surette, Propriety and Extent of Application of Brillhart/Wilton Abstention 
Doctrine to “Mixed Claims” Involving Both Declaratory and Coercive Relief, 66 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 
467 (2012). 
 19.  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 




  The American Bar Association called a bill proposed in 
Congress that would introduce declaratory judgments into the federal 
courts “[t]he most important legislation of the year affecting the 
administration of justice.”
21
  Although other legal systems had a remedy 
similar to a declaratory judgment,
22
 Congress did not move quickly to 
adopt the declaratory judgment,
23
 even after the American Bar 
Association and the National Conference Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws published the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act in 1922.
24
  
Congress held hearings during the 1920s on bills that would have 
allowed federal courts to grant declaratory judgments, but none of these 
hearings resulted in the passage of a bill permitting federal courts to 
grant such relief.
25
  Moreover, while Congress was debating these bills, 
the Supreme Court decided three cases that cast doubt on the 
constitutionality of declaratory judgments.
26
 
In 1933, however, the Supreme Court reversed course in Nashville, 
                                                          
 20.  Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural Reform, 28 YALE 
L.J. 1, 4 (1918); see also Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural 
Reform II, 28 YALE L.J. 105, 109 (1918); Edson R. Sunderland, The Courts as Authorized Legal 
Advisors of the People, 54 AM. L. REV. 161, 174 (1920); Edson R. Sunderland, A Modern Evolution 
in Remedial Rights—The Declaratory Judgment, 16 MICH. L. REV. 69, 70 (1917). 
 21.  42 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 277, 284 (1919).  
 22.  European nations had something akin to declaratory judgments in the early twentieth 
century, and England and Germany had something similar as far back as medieval times.  See 
Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural Reform, supra note 20, at 14–29.  The 
declaratory judgment goes back even further than the middle ages, however, as it can be traced back 
to ancient Rome.  See id. at 12–14; see also Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The 
Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal 
Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn’t Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 550 n.90 (1989). 
 23.  See Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward A Better Standard for Evaluating Patent 
Litigants’ Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 408 n.6 (2007) (“[A] 
bill proposing a federal declaratory judgment remedy had been introduced in every Congressional 
session from 1919 to 1932 . . . .”). 
 24.  Med. Assurance Co. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act, §§ 1 et seq.). 
 25.  See Dolak, supra note 23, at 408 n.6 (providing citations to examples of the statements 
from various hearings during the 1920s).  One of the more colorful descriptions of the need for 
declaratory judgments came from Representative Ralph Waldo Emerson Gilbert of Kentucky, who 
said, “Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the light to see if you 
stepped into a hole.  Under the declaratory law you turn on the light and then take the step.”  69 
CONG. REC. 2030 (1928) (remarks of Rep. Gilbert).  
 26.  See Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928) (observing that a 
declaratory judgment claim “is not a case or controversy within the meaning of article 3 of the 
Constitution”); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers’ Co-op. Mktg. Ass’n, 276 U.S. 
71, 89 (1928) (“This court has no jurisdiction to review a mere declaratory judgment.”); Liberty 
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 76 (1927) (holding that a state declaratory judgment law 
“neither purports to nor can extend the jurisdiction of the district courts beyond the constitutional 
limitations”); see also Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 22, at 558–61 (discussing these decisions). 
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Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Wallace
27
 and upheld Tennessee’s 
declaratory judgment law, explaining that “the Constitution does not 
require that the case or controversy should be presented by traditional 
forms of procedure, invoking only traditional remedies.  The judiciary 
clause of the Constitution defined and limited judicial power, not the 
particular method by which that power might be invoked.”
28
  With that 




Congress moved quickly after Wallace and passed the Declaratory 
Judgment Act
30
 in 1934.  The Act provides, in relevant part, 
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of 
the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may 
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 
sought.  Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final 
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
31
 
A few years later in 1937, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Act, observing that the Act limited declaratory judgments to cases in 
which a case or controversy existed under Article III
32
 and did not 
expand federal jurisdiction beyond that constitutional limit.
33
  Not until 
                                                          
 27.  Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). 
 28.  Id. at 264. 
 29.  Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 22, at 569; see also Raymond W. Beauchamp, Note, 
England’s Chilling Forecast: The Case for Granting Declaratory Relief to Prevent English 
Defamation Actions from Chilling American Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3092–93 (2006) 
(discussing Wallace and its impact); Andrew Bradt, “Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose” 
Implications of the History of the Declaratory Judgment for the (B)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L. 
REV. 767, 779–80 (2006) (same). 
 30.  Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955.  See Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 22 at 
561 n.150.  Congress left virtually no legislative record in passing the Act.  See Dolak, supra note 
23, at 408 n.6 (“The legislative history from the 1934 Congressional session is very limited because 
there were no debates in either the House or the Senate on the bill that year.” (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 
10,564–65, 10,919 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 8224 (1934))); see also Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 
22, at 561.  Scholars thus look to the hearings and debates on earlier bills that would have permitted 
federal courts to grant declaratory judgments for insight on Congress’s intentions in passing the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.  See Dolak, supra note 23, at 408 n.6; see also Doernberg & Mushlin, 
supra note 22, at 561–68. 
 31.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (emphasis added).  The Act excludes certain types of cases, 
including how organizations are classified by the Internal Revenue Service and cases involving tax 
liability in bankruptcy.  Id.  
 32.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 33.  See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937); see also Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 848 (2014) (“[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act 
does not ‘extend’ the ‘jurisdiction’ of the federal courts.” (quoting Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips 
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five years later in Brillhart, however, did the Court fully explain district 
courts’ obligations and discretion under the Act. 
B. Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. 
Litigants had enjoyed the benefits of the Declaratory Judgment Act 
for less than a decade when the Supreme Court decided Brillhart v. 
Excess Insurance Co. in 1942.  In this case, Excess Insurance Co. had 
entered into a reinsurance agreement with Central Mutual Insurance Co. 
in 1932.
34
  Two years later, Central had issued a liability policy to 
Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., and then later that year in October, a truck driven by 
a Cooper-Jarrett employee caused an accident that resulted in the death 
of Brillhart’s decedent.
35
  Brillhart sued in state court in Missouri, and 
Cooper-Jarrett sought to have Central defend the case.
36
  Central refused, 
however, claiming that the accident was not covered under the policy, so 
Cooper-Jarrett hired its own attorney.
37
 
During the litigation in the Missouri court, both Central and Cooper-
Jarrett experienced major financial problems.  Central became insolvent 
and was liquidated by an Illinois court, which entered an order 
prohibiting any claimant from prosecuting a claim against Central.
38
  
After Central went into this receivership, Cooper-Jarrett filed for 
bankruptcy.
39
  The court overseeing the bankruptcy allowed Brillhart to 
withdraw his claims in the bankruptcy action and pursue his lawsuit 
against Cooper-Jarrett, on the ground that Cooper-Jarrett had insurance.
40
  
As Brillhart pursued his claim, Cooper-Jarrett’s attorney withdrew, and 
the company never hired another lawyer to represent it, ultimately 
resulting in a default judgment of $20,000 against it.
41
  Based on this 
                                                          
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950))).  Despite this “procedural only” view of the Act, some 
scholars have argued that Congress actually did intend to expand federal jurisdiction and that the 
Court has actually permitted jurisdiction to be expanded under the Act.  See generally Doernberg & 
Mushlin, supra note 22. 
 34.  Excess Ins. Co. of Am. v. Brillhart, 121 F.2d 776, 777 (10th Cir. 1941) rev’d, Brillhart v. 
Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942).  I primarily use the Tenth Circuit’s opinion to describe 
the facts of this case because that opinion sets forth a more detailed factual background than the 
Supreme Court’s opinion. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 492 (1942); Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 121 
F.2d at 777. 
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judgment, Brillhart filed a garnishment proceeding against Central in 
Missouri state court, despite the order of the Illinois court, and judgment 
was entered for Brillhart in this case.
42
 
Excess first learned of this dispute between Brillhart and Cooper-
Jarrett when Cooper-Jarrett’s attorney in the bankruptcy proceeding 
contacted Excess in 1939 about its reinsurance agreement with Central.
43
  
Excess, before it was ever sued in state court, filed a declaratory 
judgment action in federal court in Kansas, seeking a declaration that it 
was not liable for the judgment against Central because Central had 
failed to notify Excess of the pending litigation, as the reinsurance 
agreement required Central to do.
44
  The district court dismissed the case 
“because of a reluctance to prolong the litigation.”
45
 
The Tenth Circuit reversed.  Although noting that courts have “some 
discretionary power” over whether to hear cases “[w]here a prior action 
has been filed in a court of concurrent jurisdiction between the same 
parties and involving the same issues,” the district court had no such 
authority to dismiss this case.
46
  The circuit court noted that this case 
“was squarely within the purview” of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
which was designed “to afford one who is threatened with liability an 
early opportunity to determine his rights by forcing his adversary to 
come into court and assert his claim, without waiting until it pleased [the 
adversary] to institute an action to recover.”
47
  Here, Excess was not a 
party to the garnishment proceeding, the only pending state court 
action.
48
  The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to 
decide Excess’s claim on the merits.
49
 
Brillhart appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
50
  In an 
opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Court focused on what obligation 
federal district courts have to hear cases brought under the Declaratory 
                                                          
 42.  Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 121 F.2d at 777. 
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 493. 
 45.  Id. at 493–94; see also id. at 494 n.1 (quoting the district court as saying, “Well, I don’t 
think that this court will interfere with [the state court proceedings].  The case will be dismissed. . . . 
[T]his court feels in its discretion that it ought not to interfere with that [state court] litigation in any 
way.”). 
 46.  Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 121 F.2d at 778. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 314 U.S. 606 (1942).  




  The Court explained that when a plaintiff files a 
declaratory judgment action, a district court is “under no compulsion to 
exercise that jurisdiction” granted by the Act.
52
  That “another 
proceeding was pending in a state court in which all the matters in 
controversy between the parties could [have] be[en] fully adjudicated” 
was “relevant” to determining whether a district court should exercise 
jurisdiction over the claim for declaratory relief because “[o]rdinarily it 
would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to 
proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a 
state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, 
between the same parties.”
53
 
Based on this rationale, the Court instructed that in instances such as 
this case, district courts “should ascertain whether the questions in 
controversy between the parties to the federal suit, and which are not 
foreclosed under the applicable substantive law, can better be settled in 
the proceeding pending in the state court.”
54
  In conducting this inquiry, 
district courts should consider 
the scope of the pending state court proceeding and the nature of 
defenses open there[,]. . . . whether the claims of all parties in interest 
can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary 
parties have been joined, [and] whether such parties are amenable to 
process in that proceeding . . . .
55
 
District courts should also consider any other factors that may be 




Applying this standard, the Court held that the district court abused 
its discretion because the district court did not consider whether Excess’s 
claims were foreclosed under Missouri law or could be considered by the 
state court in the garnishment proceeding.
57
  Rather than “attempt[ing] to 
pronounce independently upon Missouri law,” the Court remanded the 
case to the district court to consider these issues in determining whether 
                                                          
 51.  See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 493–95 (1942). 
 52.  Id. at 494. 
 53.  Id. at 495; see also id. (“Gratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive 
disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided.”). 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  See id. (“We do not now attempt a comprehensive enumeration of what in other cases may 
be revealed as relevant factors governing the exercise of a district court’s discretion.”). 
 57.  Id. at 495–97. 





The standard that the Court adopted in Brillhart provides “[district] 
courts great freedom in deciding whether to entertain declaratory 
judgment actions.”
59
  By not limiting the relevant factors that district 
courts can consider when determining whether to exercise jurisdiction, 
the Court recognized that district judges have their “boots on the ground” 
to examine carefully the facts of each case.
60
  This broad discretion 
permitted by Brillhart allows district courts to make their decisions on a 
case-by-case basis, giving them a necessary degree of flexibility to reach 
a just result in each case.
61
  Additionally, this discretion represented an 
exception to the general rule that a federal court “could not abdicate its 
authority or duty in favor of the state [court’s] jurisdiction.”
62
  Finally, 
this standard recognizes that state courts are as competent as any federal 
court to resolve the legal issues before them.
63
 
                                                          
 58.  Id. at 497–98.   
  Chief Justice Stone dissented.  He argued that “the question whether [Excess] can litigate its 
present cause of action in the statutory garnishment proceeding in Missouri is at best not free from 
doubt,” as the Missouri Supreme Court had not opined on this question.  Id. at 500–01 (Stone, C.J., 
dissenting).  Believing that a district court “plainly [has] its duty to hear and decide all the issues 
necessary for disposition of the case unless it was made to appear with reasonable certainty that the 
issues could be adjudicated in [a state court proceeding],” the Chief Justice argued that Excess 
“ought not to be penalized” for invoking federal jurisdiction here to have its claims answered.  Id. at 
500, 502 (emphasis added). 
  In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas focused on Chief Justice Stone’s dissent about 
whether Excess was already bound under Missouri law to pay the damages owed to Brillhart, 
arguing that the Chief Justice focused too narrowly on whether Excess’s claims could be litigated in 
Missouri court, without considering whether these claims “had been ‘previously foreclosed’ under 
Missouri law.”  See id. at 498 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 59.  Grace M. Giesel, The Expanded Discretion of Lower Courts to Regulate Access to the 
Federal Courts After Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.: Declaratory Judgment Actions and Implications 
Far Beyond, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 405 (1996). 
 60.  United States v. Van Nguyen, 602 F.3d 886, 896 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). 
 61.  See Recent Case, Declaratory Judgments—Granting of Declaratory Judgment on Issues 
Involved in Pending Criminal Prosecution in Justice of Peace Court Held Not Abuse of Discretion, 
59 HARV. L. REV. 1311, 1312–13 (1946) (discussing various approaches to when a court should 
refuse to grant a declaratory judgment and concluding that “the better practice is to examine each 
individual case and openly weigh the factors creating a need for declaratory relief against the general 
reasons for denying it”). 
 62.  Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); see also Note, Power to Stay 
Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE L.J. 978, 980–81 
(1950). 
 63.  See Giesel, supra note 59, at 405 (“[Brillhart] implicitly, if not explicitly, represented a 
view that state courts are capable and fair arbiters of legal issues.”); see also Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 
F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1972) (“[W]e must assume that [a state] court would properly determine the 
merits of any federal issue properly presented to it.”); Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s shaping of jurisdictional rules 
“defeat[s] the notion that federal courts must address all questions of federal rights”).  
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After the Court decided Brillhart, lower federal courts used the 
discretion they were given in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction in 
declaratory judgment claims.  For instance, in Southern California 
Petroleum Corp. v. Harper,
64
 the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court’s 
decision not to exercise jurisdiction.  In this case, Harper, a landowner in 
Texas, had a dispute with Southern California Petroleum over oil and gas 
leases on his land.
65
  In 1955, Harper sued Southern California Petroleum 
in federal court, alleging that the lease had not been properly developed 
and that wells had not been properly operated, but he lost this suit.
66
  In 
1958, Harper sued Southern California Petroleum Corp. again on similar 
theories, this time based specifically on a waterflood program begun 
earlier that year, which Harper claimed would destroy the value of his 
land.
67
  Southern California Petroleum and a codefendant removed the 
case to federal court and filed a complaint of their own, seeking to 
remove an alleged cloud on their title and a declaratory judgment relating 
to the development of the leases.
68
  The district court remanded Harper’s 
case back to state court for lack of diversity and dismissed Southern 
California Petroleum’s claims, refusing to grant declaratory relief 
because those issues were the same as the issues in Harper’s pending 
state court case.
69
  Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge John Minor 
Wisdom cited Brillhart before noting, “[t]he policy against federal 
interference with a state suit previously filed is of long standing and is a 
necessary objective in maintaining a balanced federal-state 
                                                          
  This view underlies Justice Story’s decision in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 315 
(1816), when he wrote that lower federal courts “may not exist [unless Congress chooses to create 
them]; and, therefore, the appellate jurisdiction must extend beyond appeals from the courts of the 
United States only.  The state courts are to adjudicate under the supreme law of the land, as a rule 
binding upon them.” 
  Even before the Supreme Court decided Brillhart and provided guidance for when courts 
can refuse to hear claims for declaratory relief, some courts had recognized the limits on how 
litigants could use declaratory judgments.  See, e.g., Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.2d 613, 
617 (7th Cir. 1939) (“The wholesome purposes of declaratory acts would be aborted by its use as an 
instrument of procedural fencing either to secure delay or to choose a forum.  It was not intended by 
the act to enable a party to obtain a change of tribunal and thus accomplish in a particular case what 
could not be accomplished under the removal act, and such would be the result in the instant case.”).  
For these courts, Brillhart simply affirmed the approach that they had adopted. 
 64.  S. Cal. Petrol. Corp. v. Harper, 273 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1960). 
 65.  Id. at 716. 
 66.  Id. at 716–17. 
 67.  Id. at 717. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 717–18. 




  Given this policy, the court of appeals held that the 
district court was within its discretion in dismissing the claims for 
declaratory relief. 
Of course, although courts of appeals frequently cited Brillhart’s 
standard for not deciding claims for declaratory relief, they did not 
simply rubberstamp district courts’ decisions not to grant that relief.  For 
example, in Franklin Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson,
71
 the Tenth Circuit 
explained, “[T]he trial court is vested with rather wide discretion in 
determining whether or not it will exercise existing jurisdiction . . . . But 
it is a judicial discretion, subject to review, and must be exercised in 
accordance with legal principles.”
72
  In this case, Franklin Life Insurance 
Co. had sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable under a life 
insurance policy because the decedent’s death was caused by a self-
inflicted gunshot wound.
73
  The decedent’s wife, Johnson, however, filed 
suit in Colorado state court, seeking benefits under the policy, which led 
the district court to dismiss Franklin Life’s claim for declaratory relief.
74
  
Considering the “practical considerations affecting the interrelation of 
courts exercising coordinate and concurrent jurisdiction,”
75
 the Tenth 
Circuit reasoned that the district court had no basis for not hearing the 
declaratory judgment claim because the state court case was filed two 
months after the case began in federal court,
76
 and the state court case did 
not include all relevant parties.
77
 
C. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. 
For decades, Brillhart provided clear guidance for lower federal 
courts having to decide whether to decide claims for declaratory relief.  
                                                          
 70.  Id. at 720; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Frusetta, 290 F.2d 689, 691–92 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding 
that a district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hear a claim for declaratory relief 
when a litigant tried to accomplish through the Declaratory Judgment Act what it could not achieve 
under the removal statutes).  
 71.  Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 157 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1946). 
 72.  Id. at 656. 
 73.  Id. at 655. 
 74.  Id. at 656. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id. at 657. 
 77.  Id. at 658.  The policy named Cora Johnson as the primary beneficiary and Helen Johnson 
as the contingent beneficiary, who would receive benefits only after Cora Johnson died and some 
value of the policy remained unpaid.  Id.; see also Am. Cas. Co. of Reading v. Howard, 173 F.2d 
924, 928 (4th Cir. 1949) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by not hearing a claim 
for declaratory relief because the case would clarify unsettled legal issues and provide relief from 
uncertainty for the parties).  
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The situation became more complicated, however, after the Supreme 
Court decided Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United 
States in 1976. 
1. Colorado River and the Subsequent Confusion. 
The federal government, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345,
78
 sued 
approximately 1,000 water users in Colorado, seeking a declaration of 
the United States’ rights to that water.
79
  Shortly after this suit was filed, 
one of the defendants joined the United States in ongoing proceedings in 
state court, using the McCarran Amendment
80
 to bring the United States 
into that action.
81
  The district court abstained from deciding the case 




Beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court laid forth a seemingly 
simple proposition: “[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction 
is the exception, not the rule.”
83
  The Court walked through its various 
abstention doctrines, including when a constitutional question can be 
avoided,
84
 when a case presents difficult questions of state law bearing 
on important public policy issues,
85
 and when federal jurisdiction has 
been invoked to thwart state criminal proceedings (absent bad faith from 
                                                          
 78.  28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the 
United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.”). 
 79.  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976). 
 80.  43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012) (“Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in 
any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) 
for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in 
the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or 
otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit.”). 
 81.  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 806. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 813. 
 84.  See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).  See generally Martha 
A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974) (discussing Pullman abstention and its operation). 
 85.  See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1959); Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333–34 (1943).  Although these cases do not address exactly the same 
issue, the Supreme Court in Colorado River treated them as the same type of abstention, a 
characterization that scholars have also recognized.  Compare Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 
424 U.S. at 814–15, with 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 4245 (3d ed. 2004).  On the Burford doctrine’s development, see generally 
Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law from Burford to 
Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of Judicial Federalism Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and Kindred 
Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859 (1993). 
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or harassment by state officials),
86
 ultimately concluding that this case 
did not fit within any of these categories.
87
  Based on 
the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them. . . . and the absence of weightier considerations 
of constitutional adjudication and state-federal relations, the 
circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the 
presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial 




Such factors to consider include which court had jurisdiction over a 
case first, the inconvenience of the federal forum, and the desirability of 
avoiding piecemeal litigation, with “[o]nly the clearest of 
justifications . . . warrant[ing] dismissal.”
89
 
Here, the Court held that the district court properly dismissed the suit 
because the McCarran Amendment reflected the desire to have water-
rights issues decided in a single proceeding, the lack of substantial 
proceedings in the district court, and the involvement of so many state-
law water rights with 1,000 defendants.
90
 
Colorado River reflected Chief Justice Marshall’s language in 
Cohens v. Virginia
91
 in 1821, when he wrote that federal courts have 
“no . . . right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given.”
92
  
Almost immediately after the Court decided Colorado River, scholars 
                                                          
 86.  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971).  See generally George D. Brown, When 
Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide—Rethinking Younger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 114 (1990) (discussing the tension between federalism and separation of powers in Younger 
and predicting that this tension will lead to a rethinking of the doctrine based on the policies that 
undergird it). 
 87.  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814–17. 
 88.  Id. at 817–18. 
 89.  Id. at 819. 
 90.  Id. at 820.  This decision affirmed the district court’s decision, but it reversed the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision, which had held that the district court erred in not deciding the case.  Id. at 821.  
For a concise summary and analysis of Colorado River, see James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity 
Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1092–95 (1994). 
 91.  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). 
 92.  Id. at 404; see also England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) 
(“There are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked the 
jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims can be compelled, 
without his consent and through no fault of his own, to accept instead a state court’s determination of 
those claims.”); Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co. of N.Y., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (“When a Federal court 
is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such 
jurisdiction . . . .”); David A. Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 
TUL. L. REV. 651, 652–64 (1985) (discussing how Colorado River fits with Supreme Court 
precedent and other abstention doctrines). 
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recognized its potential impact on abstention doctrines,
93
 and courts 
recognized the tension between Colorado River and Brillhart.
94
 
Unsurprisingly, this tension resulted in a circuit split.  Some circuits, 




 held that Colorado River’s 
“exceptional circumstances” test applied to district courts’ determination 
of whether to hear a claim for declaratory relief.  Other circuits, however, 




 continued to treat Brillhart as the 
standard in cases involving declaratory relief. 
2. Clarifying the Confusion 
After the circuit split developed about whether Brillhart or Colorado 
River applied to decisions not to exercise jurisdiction over claims for 
declaratory relief, the Supreme Court took up Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. 
to resolve the division among the lower courts. 
Wilton started in 1992 with a dispute over oil and gas leases in Texas 
that was destined for litigation.
99
  One party to that dispute, the Hill 
                                                          
 93.  See generally Michael M. Wilson, Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in 
Deference to Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 
641 (1977).  Although Colorado River is often considered an abstention doctrine of its own, courts 
and scholars do not necessarily agree on this terminology.  See Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the 
Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811, 833 & 
nn.104–06 (1991) (discussing how courts and scholars characterize Colorado River). 
 94.  See, e.g., Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. DiGregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1254 & n.4 
(9th Cir. 1987); Fuller Co. v. Ramon I. Gil, Inc., 782 F.2d 306, 308–11 (1st Cir. 1986); Calvert Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Am. Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1233–34 (7th Cir. 1979). 
  Even the Supreme Court was not quite clear on the relationship of Colorado River and 
Brillhart and the applicable standard for when a district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction.  
In Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., a plurality of the Court held that “the pendency of an action in 
the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having 
jurisdiction,” even if the district court was “under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction.”  Will 
v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662 (1978) (citations omitted).  The plurality cited Brillhart 
for support here, stating that Colorado River had not undermined that earlier decision.  Id. at 664.  
Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the judgment, disagreed with this interpretation of Colorado 
River, believing that the Court may have cut back on Brillhart.  Id. at 667–68 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Marshall and Powell, believed that Brillhart was not the appropriate standard, but instead Colorado 
River was, albeit because of the nature of the claims in Will, which did not ask for a declaratory 
judgment.  Id. at 671–72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 95.  See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Conn. Bank & Tr. Co., 806 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
 96.  See Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Mo. Elec. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1372, 1374–75 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
 97.  See Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 237–38 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 98.  See Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 996 F.2d 774, 778 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 99.  Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 279 (1995). 
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Group, informed London Underwriters of the pending litigation and 
sought coverage under commercial liability policies, but London 
Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group.
100
  That 
litigation resulted in a verdict in excess of $100 million against the Hill 
Group, and the Hill Group informed London Underwriters of the 
verdict.
101
  London Underwriters sought a declaratory judgment in 
federal court that it was not liable under the policy.
102
  After negotiations, 
London Underwriters dismissed the case, but the Hill Group agreed to 
give two weeks’ notice if it intended to sue on the policy.
103
  The Hill 
Group gave notice of its intent to sue on February 23, 1993, and the next 
day, London Underwriters filed its declaratory judgment claim in federal 
court.
104
  About a month later, the Hill Group filed its suit in state court 
in Texas and moved to dismiss or stay the declaratory judgment action in 
federal court.
105
  The district court stayed the action, reasoning “that the 
state lawsuit pending in [Texas state court] encompassed the same 
coverage issues raised in the declaratory judgment action” and finding 
“that a stay was warranted in order to avoid piecemeal litigation and to 
bar London Underwriters’ attempts at forum shopping.”
106
 
Despite London Underwriters’ argument that Colorado River and 
subsequent cases
107
 made Brillhart “an outmoded relic of another era,” 
the Supreme Court emphasized that Colorado River and later cases were 
not in the context of declaratory judgments.
108
  The Court recognized that 
the Declaratory Judgment Act “confer[s] on federal courts unique and 
substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of 
litigants.”
109
  The use of “may” in the statute “distinguish[es] the 
declaratory judgment context from other areas of the law in which 
                                                          
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 280. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Specifically, London Underwriters pointed to Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983), in which the Court held that the Colorado River 
“exceptional circumstances” test applied to motions to compel arbitration under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).  In Moses H. Cone, the Court quoted Colorado River to 
hold that “[a]bdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified . . . only in the exceptional 
circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an 
important countervailing interest.”  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 14 (quoting Colo. 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)). 
 108.  Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286. 
 109.  Id.  
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concepts of discretion surface.”
110
  Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act 
is “an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than 
an absolute right upon the litigant,”
111
 and “the normal principle that 
federal courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to 
considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration.”
112
 
The Supreme Court therefore clarified that in the context of 
declaratory judgments, district courts continued to possess broad 
discretion in deciding whether to grant relief.
113
  No longer would 
Colorado River and subsequent cases cause any confusion about the 
standard for declining to hear claims for declaratory relief.  Only for 
claims seeking nondeclaratory relief had the Court imposed a much more 
restrictive standard in Colorado River, permitting a district court to 
decline to hear a case only in exceptional circumstances. 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER MIXED COMPLAINTS 
Despite Wilton’s clarification about the standard for district courts 
not to decide declaratory judgment claims, that decision left open some 
issues about the standard for not deciding claims involving declaratory 
relief.  Although the Supreme Court has articulated a clear standard for 
complaints that sought exclusively one type of relief—either declaratory 
or nondeclaratory—the Court has never given such guidance for mixed 
complaints.  Unsurprisingly, a circuit split has subsequently developed 
on this question. 
This circuit split includes four distinct approaches.  The first 
approach is that the court never applies the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine to 
mixed claims.  The second approach is that the court must determine if 
the claims for nondeclaratory relief are jurisdictionally independent from 
the claims for declaratory relief, and if so, apply the Colorado River 
doctrine.  The third approach is that the court looks to the “heart of the 
                                                          
 110.  Id. at 287. 
 111.  Id. (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952)); see also Pub. 
Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962) (“The Declaratory Judgment Act was an 
authorization, not a command.  It gave the federal courts competence to make a declaration of rights; 
it did not impose a duty to do so.”). 
 112.  Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288; see also id. (“By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought 
to place a remedial arrow in the district court’s quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a duty, 
to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants.”).  The Court did note that in most cases, “a stay 
[rather than a dismissal] will often be the preferable course, because it assures that the federal action 
can proceed without risk of a time bar if the state case, for any reason, fails to resolve the matter in 
controversy.”  Id. at 290 n.2. 
 113.  For discussion and analysis of Wilton, see generally Giesel, supra note 599. 
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complaint” and applies the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine if the essence of the 
complaint seeks declaratory relief.  The final approach is that the court 
separates the claims for declaratory and nondeclaratory relief and applies 
the appropriate standard to each type of claim. 
A. The First Approach: Brillhart/Wilton Never Applies 
Four circuits—the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth—have adopted 
this approach.  These courts have adopted this bright-line, categorical 
rule that prohibits district courts from applying the Brillhart/Wilton 
doctrine if a complaint includes any claims that seek nondeclaratory 
relief. 
The Fifth Circuit was an early adopter of this view, doing so in 1994 
in Southwind Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen Aviation, Inc.
114
  In that case, 
Southwind contracted with Bergen to repair an aircraft.
115
  After the 
repairs took longer and cost more than initially anticipated, Bergan filed 
suit against Southwind in Texas state court, and Southwind later filed 
suit in federal court.
116
  Southwind sought declaratory relief and 
monetary damages from Bergan.
117
  The district court construed the case 
as one seeking declaratory relief, and it applied the more lenient Brillhart 
standard rather than the stricter Colorado River test.
118
 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s 
analysis.  After noting the difference in Brillhart and Colorado River, the 
court of appeals recognized that the case involved nondeclaratory relief 
claims in addition to the ones for declaratory relief.
119
  Because 
Southwind sought both declaratory and nondeclaratory relief, the court 
proclaimed that the “[i]nclusion of these coercive remedies indisputably 
remove[d] this suit from the ambit of a declaratory judgment action.”
120
  
Therefore, the district court erred in applying Brillhart, and the court of 
appeals remanded the case for the district court to apply Colorado River, 
                                                          
 114.  Southwind Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen Aviation, Inc., 23 F.3d 948, 950–51 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(per curiam).   
  This case was actually decided before Wilton, but because the Fifth Circuit had already 
interpreted Colorado River as not abrogating Brillhart, the Fifth Circuit could already face a mixed-
complaint question before Wilton was decided. 
 115.  Id. at 949. 
 116.  Id. at 949–50. 
 117.  Id. at 951. 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id. at 950–51. 
 120.  Id. at 951. 
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which the circuit court held was the proper standard for determining 
whether to abstain from deciding this mixed-complaint case.
121
 
The Fifth Circuit has been so firm in this rule that it has applied the 
rule even when a party initially filed only claims for declaratory relief 
and did not add claims for nondeclaratory relief until after the opposing 
party moved to abstain.  In Kelly Investment, Inc. v. Continental 
Common Corp.,
122
 Continental Common had sued Kelly Investment
123
 in 
Texas state court, alleging a breach of promissory notes.
124
  While this 
litigation was ongoing, Kelly Investment sought multiple declaratory 
judgments relating to the promissory notes in Louisiana state court, 
which Continental Common removed to federal district court.
125
  After 
the case was removed and Continental Common moved to abstain, Kelly 
Investment added claims for monetary relief as well.
126
  The district court 
applied the Colorado River doctrine, despite the fact that Kelly 
Investment added its claims for money damages after Continental 
Common filed its motion to abstain.
127
 
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Colorado 
River test applied and that, on these facts, that test was not met.
128
  
Specifically, as for the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine, the court observed that 
“Brillhart is only applicable ‘when a district court is considering 
abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment 
action.’  In contrast, when an action contains any claim for coercive 
relief, the Colorado River abstention doctrine is ordinarily applicable.”
129
 
Notably, in a footnote in Kelly Investment, the Fifth Circuit left open 
the door that this rule is not always applicable to mixed complaints.  The 
court reasoned that Kelly Investment’s claims for monetary damages 
were “not frivolous, and there is no evidence that Kelly added them 
solely as a means of defeating Brillhart.”
130
  Hence, this “bright-line” 
                                                          
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Kelly Inv., Inc. v. Cont’l Common Corp., 315 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 123.  Continental Common actually sued Dynex Commercial, Inc., but Kelly Investment 
purchased the interest in the interest in the promissory notes, making it the party in interest.  Id. at 
496. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. at 497. 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 497 n.4 (citations omitted) (quoting Southwind Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen Aviation, 
Inc., 23 F.3d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 130.  Id. 
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rule may not be quite as bright as it might first appear, and now the Fifth 
Circuit recognizes these two exceptions—that the claims for 
nondeclaratory relief were frivolous or added for the purpose of 
defeating application of the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine—as the “only” 
exceptions to its bright-line rule.
131
 
The Second Circuit adopted this view in its 1999 decision in Village 
of Westfield v. Welch’s.
132
  In this case, the Village of Westfield had built 
a new wastewater treatment facility, and it charged Welch’s certain user 
fees based on Welch’s grape-processing plant in the village.
133
  Welch’s 
sued the village in New York state court in 1984, alleging that the village 
had overcharged Welch’s for fees, and then the next year, Welch’s filed a 
second suit, which was consolidated with the first suit, based on the 
village’s changes to the user fees.
134
  This state court litigation continued 
for more than a decade, during which time the state court reversed itself 
on multiple occasions.
135
  In 1997—thirteen years after Welch’s first 
filed suit—the village filed its own suit in state court, seeking fees from 
the previous two years from Welch’s.
136
  Welch’s removed the case to 
federal court and asserted counterclaims for a declaration of its rights and 
damages from the village.
137
  The district court granted the village’s 
motion to stay the case based on the state court litigation.
138
 
The Second Circuit ultimately reversed the district court.  The court 
of appeals framed the issue in terms of Colorado River, noting courts’ 
“‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise their jurisdiction,”
139
 unless 









  The court held that the six-factor 
                                                          
 131.  See New Eng. Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 561 F.3d 392, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 132.  Vill. of Westfield v. Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 133.  Id. at 118. 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Id. at 118–19. 
 136.  Id. at 119. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 120. 
 139.  Id. (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 
(1976)). 
 140.  See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–54 (1971) (holding that abstention is appropriate if 
state criminal proceedings are pending).  
 141.  See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–34 (1943) (holding that abstention is 
appropriate to avoid interfering with attempts to establish a coherent state regulatory policy). 
 142.  See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498–501 (1941) (holding that 
abstention is appropriate to avoid unnecessarily deciding a constitutional issue when that issue might 
be mooted by resolution of a state-law question). 
 143.  Vill. of Westfield, 170 F.3d at 120. 
2016] UNMIXING THE MESS 813 
 
test for determining whether Colorado River abstention is appropriate
144
 
was not met here.
145
  The court addressed Wilton only in a footnote, 
observing that in that case the Supreme Court has clarified that Colorado 
River did not apply to claims for declaratory relief but that “Wilton [did] 
not apply here.”
146
  The court noted that although Welch’s sought a 
declaratory judgment, it also sought damages from the village.
147
 
Although the court never explicitly stated that it was applying a 
bright-line rule that the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine did not apply to a 
mixed complaint, that is the clear implication of this holding.  But if this 
statement in a footnote about Wilton’s inapplicability left any doubt as to 
the Second Circuit’s position, the Second Circuit removed that doubt in 
Kanciper v. Suffolk County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, Inc.
148
  There, the court explicitly held that “Wilton does not 
apply where, as here, a plaintiff does not seek purely declaratory relief, 
but also . . . seeks damages caused by the defendant’s conduct.”
149
 
The Tenth Circuit is the third court of appeals that has adopted this 
bright-line rule, although it has not done so as explicitly as the Second 
and Fifth Circuits.  In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Amoco Production Co.,
150
 the 
court drew a bright line between “declaratory actions” and “coercive 
actions,” observing that unlike claims for coercive relief, “declaratory 
actions do not invoke the federal judiciary’s ‘virtually unflagging 
obligation’ to exercise its jurisdiction.”
151
  The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed 
this position in United States v. City of Las Cruces
152
 a decade later when 
the court applied the Brillhart/Wilton standard when the plaintiff sought 
“only declaratory relief.”
153
  The court focused on the “nature of the 
                                                          
 144.  See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (setting 
forth the factors a court should consider in determining whether to abstain under Colorado River).  
 145.  Vill. of Westfield, 170 F.3d at 124–25. 
 146.  Id. at 124 n.5. 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Kanciper v. Suffolk Cty. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc., 722 F.3d 88 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
 149.  Id. at 93 (quoting Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regulating 
Dist., 673 F.3d 84, 106 (2d Cir. 2012)).  In Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., the Second Circuit 
discussed whether abstention under the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine was appropriate in a mixed-
complaint case, despite the clear language in Village of Westfield.  See Niagra Mohawk Power 
Corp., 673 F.3d at 104–06.  This discussion suggests that the court did not consider Village of 
Westfield not to be controlling, but its reasoning gave the court no pause to treat this language as the 
basis for the holding in Kanciper. 
 150.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 982 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 151.  Id. at 440. 
 152.  United States v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 153.  Id. at 1181 (emphasis added). 
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relief requested . . . , not the jurisdictional basis of the suit,” to determine 
whether the case was declaratory or coercive in nature.
154
 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit adopted this view in 2015 in its decision 
in vonRosenberg v. Lawrence.
155
  In that case, two Episcopal clergymen 
disputed who was the proper leader of the Diocese of South Carolina, 
and vonRosenberg sued Lawrence, seeking declaratory and 
nondeclaratory relief.
156
  This included claims under the Lanham Act,
157
 
which are subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.
158
  Meanwhile, some 
of Lawrence’s supporters had previously sued vonRosenberg in state 
court on claims arising from the same dispute.
159
  Lawrence moved to 
stay the case in federal court, and the district court granted the stay under 
Brillhart/Wilton.
160
  The Fourth Circuit vacated that order and remanded 
the case, holding that the district court should have applied Colorado 
River.
161
  The court of appeals reasoned that applying Brillhart/Wilton to 
mixed complaints “would ignore the very different justifications for the 
two abstention standards” and that Brillhart/Wilton “provides a poor fit 
for causes of action over which a federal court generally must exercise 
jurisdiction.”
162
  Stating that it “join[ed]” the position adopted by the 
Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, the court held that adopting another 
rule “would deprive a plaintiff of access to a federal forum simply 




                                                          
 154.  Id.  
 155.  vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, 781 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 156.  Id. at 732.  
 157.  15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
 158.  vonRosenberg, 781 F.3d at 733. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 735–36. 
 162.  Id. at 735. 
 163.  Id. (“Such a penalty for requesting a declaration seems especially unwarranted given that 
nearly all claims, including those for damages or injunctive relief, effectively ask a court to declare 
the rights of the parties to the suit.  To ensure that they have asked for all available relief, plaintiffs 
commonly add a request for declaratory relief in addition to requests for equitable or monetary relief.  
We decline to adopt a rule that would transform that thoroughness into a handicap.”). 
  Several other observations about this case are warranted.  First, vonRosenberg should also 
make clear that the Fourth Circuit does not follow the First Circuit’s “surgical” approach, as some 
courts and scholars have previously suggested.  See, e.g., New Eng. Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 561 F.3d 
392, 395 (5th Cir. 2009); Mass. Biologic Labs. of the Univ. of Mass. v. Medimmune, LLC, 871 F. 
Supp. 2d 29, 34 (D. Mass. 2012); Mamone, supra note 16, at 364. 
  Second, the court implicitly addressed another question in vonRosenberg: that Colorado 
River abstention can apply to claims subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.  Other circuit courts, 
however, have held to the contrary.  See, e.g., Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz, 713 F.2d 433, 435–36 (9th 
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B. The Second Approach: Brillhart/Wilton Applies Only if Claims for 
Nondeclaratory Relief Are Not Jurisdictionally Independent 
This second approach, adopted by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, 
takes a more nuanced approach than the bright-line rule discussed in 
Section A.  Courts adhering to this approach consider the particular 
claims in a mixed complaint, determining if the claims for 
nondeclaratory relief are jurisdictionally independent of the claims for 
declaratory relief.  If the claims for nondeclaratory relief are 
independent, then the court will not apply the Brillhart/Wilton standard; 
on the other hand, if those claims are not independent, then the court will 
apply this more lenient standard. 
The Ninth Circuit is credited with first adopting this approach.
164
  
Faced with another appeal in “a seemingly never-ending bout of 
litigation,”
165
 the court of appeals acknowledged that its jurisprudence 
“concerning the scope of the district court’s discretion to decline 
jurisdiction over declaratory claims joined with other causes of action 
[had] been less than crystal clear.”
166
  The court noted that in some cases 
it had “applied the principle that ‘when other claims are joined with an 
action for declaratory relief (e.g., bad faith, breach of contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty, rescission, or claims for other monetary relief), the 
district court should not, as a general rule, remand or decline to entertain 
the claim for declaratory relief.’”
167
  The court noted that in other cases, 
however, it had “concluded that the presence of claims for monetary 




The court clarified that in mixed-complaint cases 
[t]he appropriate inquiry for a district court in a Declaratory Judgment 
Act case is to determine whether there are claims in the case that exist 
independent of any request for purely declaratory relief, that is, claims 
                                                          
Cir. 1983); Andrea Theatres, Inc. v. Theatre Confections, Inc., 787 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1986).  
Courts’ division on this question is becoming more prominent, and it is a question I will take up in a 
forthcoming article. 
 164.  See R.R. Street & Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 711, 715–16 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(relying on United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2001), as the 
basis for this approach). 
 165.  R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d at 1105. 
 166.  Id. at 1112. 
 167.  Id. (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 168.  Id. (citing Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cos., 103 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp. v. Karussos, 65 F.3d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
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that would continue to exist if the request for a declaration simply 
dropped from the case.
169
 
Describing this test in more detail, the court wrote: 
The proper analysis, then, must be whether the claim for monetary 
relief is independent in the sense that it could be litigated in federal 
court even if no declaratory claim had been filed.  In other words, the 
district court should consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction 
over the monetary claim alone, and if so, whether that claim must be 
joined with one for declaratory relief.
170
 
The Seventh Circuit undertook a detailed analysis of this approach in 
R.R. Street & Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
171
 a case that provides a 
useful case study of this approach in practice.  There, Vulcan entered into 
an agreement with R.R. Street that made R.R. Street the exclusive 
distributor of a Vulcan product and required Vulcan to defend and 
indemnify R.R. Street for all claims brought against R.R. Street based on 
that company’s distribution of Vulcan’s product.
172
  Vulcan refused to 
defend R.R. Street in several lawsuits filed based on harms from the 
product R.R. Street was distributing.
173
  National Union Fire Insurance 
Company—an insurer that had policies with Vulcan—had been 
defending R.R. Street in these lawsuits based on a separate policy that 
National Union had with R.R. Street.
174
  R.R. Street and National Union 
filed suit against Vulcan in the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a 
declaration that Vulcan was obligated to defend and indemnify R.R. 
Street and bringing claims for breach of contract, common-law 
indemnity, and promissory estoppel, for which the plaintiffs sought 
money damages.
175
  The district court determined that the 
Wilton/Brillhart doctrine applied to the entire case because “the 
plaintiffs’ claims for damages were dependent upon their claim for 
declaratory relief,” concluding that the case should be dismissed.
176
 
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with this conclusion.  After noting the 
                                                          
 169.  Id. (quoting Snodgrass v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1167–68 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (per curiam)). 
 170.  Id. at 1113. 
 171.  R.R. Street & Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 172.  Id. at 713. 
 173.  Id. at 713–14.  
 174.  Id. at 713.  
 175.  Id. at 713–14.  National Union had earlier filed a separate suit in California state court 
seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to Vulcan under the insurance policies.  Id. at 713. 
 176.  Id. at 714. 
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various positions taken by other circuit courts,
177
 the Seventh Circuit 
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s position.
178
  The court reasoned that this 
position, although perhaps not as easy to apply as the bright-line 
approach of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, preserved the 
“unique and substantial discretion” that district courts enjoy over 
whether to hear claims for declaratory relief.
179
  The court articulated this 
approach in the following test: 
Where state and federal proceedings are parallel and the federal suit 
contains claims for both declaratory and non-declaratory relief, the 
district court should determine whether the claims seeking non-
declaratory relief are independent of the declaratory claim.  If they are 
not, the court can exercise its discretion under Wilton/Brillhart and 
abstain from hearing the entire action.  But if they are, the 
Wilton/Brillhart doctrine does not apply and, subject to the presence of 
exceptional circumstances under the Colorado River doctrine, the court 
must hear the independent non-declaratory claims.  The district court 
then should retain the declaratory claim under Wilton/Brillhart (along 




The Seventh Circuit then explained, “[a] claim for non-declaratory 
relief is ‘independent’ of the declaratory claim if: 1) it has its own federal 
subject-matter-jurisdictional basis, and 2) its viability is not wholly 
dependent upon the success of the declaratory claim.”
181
 
Applying this test to this case, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
district court erred in applying the Wilton/Brillhart doctrine because “the 
non-declaratory claims are independent of the declaratory claim because 
they could stand alone in federal court—both jurisdictionally and 
substantively—irrespective of the declaratory claim.”
182
 
C. The Third Approach: Brillhart/Wilton Applies if the Heart of the 
Complaint Seeks Declaratory Relief 
The third approach to mixed-complaint cases is the “heart of the 
complaint” rule.  Like the jurisdictional-independence rule, this approach 
                                                          
 177.  Id. at 715–16.  This overview provides a useful and easy-to-follow guide (at least 
theoretically) for applying this approach. 
 178.  Id. at 716. 
 179.  Id. (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)). 
 180.  Id. at 716–17 (footnotes omitted). 
 181.  Id. at 716 n.6. 
 182.  Id. at 717. 
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focuses on the factual allegations in the complaint and the relationship 
between claims seeking declaratory and nondeclaratory relief to 
determine the “essence of the suit.”
183
  If the claims are fundamentally 
declaratory in nature, then the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine applies; if, 
however, the claims are at their core nondeclaratory, then the Colorado 
River doctrine applies.
184
  Put another way, “[i]f the outcome of the 
coercive claims hinges on the outcome of the declaratory ones, Wilton’s 




This approach is identified with the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Apex Oil Co.,
186
 which involved Royal 
Indemnity’s mixed complaint seeking relief from Apex Oil and various 
insurance companies related to contaminants that Apex Oil allegedly 
deposited into the soil surrounding its refinery.
187
  After the United 
States, the State of Illinois, and individuals sued Apex Oil over these 
contaminants, Apex Oil sued Royal Indemnity and other companies in 
Illinois state court, seeking a declaration of the parties’ rights and 
duties.
188
  Royal Indemnity then sued Apex Oil and other insurance 
companies in federal court in the Eastern District of Missouri.
189
  Apex 
Oil moved to dismiss this suit based on the fact that it was parallel to the 
case in Illinois state court.
190
  Applying the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine, the 
district court dismissed the case.
191
 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted the “uniqueness” of the 
Brillhart/Wilton doctrine’s relaxed standard for abstention.
192
  It 
                                                          
 183.  Royal Indem. Co. v. Apex Oil Co., 511 F.3d 788, 793–94 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 184.  Mamone distinguishes the approach of the Eighth Circuit, which he calls the “essence of 
the suit” rule, from the approach of various district courts, which he refers to as the “heart of the 
action” rule.  Mamone, supra note 16, at 366–68.  Given that these approaches seem 
indistinguishable apart from their language, they need not be categorized separately.  Compare 
Royal Indem. Co., 511 F.3d at 793–96 (applying essence-of-the-suit rule and finding Brillhart/Wilton 
applied to declaratory suit seeking monetary damages as well), with ITT Indus., Inc. v. Pac. Emp’rs 
Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 2d 552, 557 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (applying heart-of-the-action rule and finding 
Brillhart/Wilton applied to declaratory suit that also involved a breach of contract claim). 
 185.  ITT Indus., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (quoting Coltec Indus. Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., No. 
04-5718, 2005 WL 1126951, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2005)). 
 186.  Royal Indem. Co., 511 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 187.  Id. at 791. 
 188.  Id.  
 189.  Id. at 790–91. 
 190.  Id. at 792.  Apex Oil amended its complaint in Illinois state court to name the same entities 
as defendants in that case that Royal Indemnity had named in the federal court case.  Id. at 791–92. 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  Id. at 793. 
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observed that “the fact that Royal Indemnity Company seeks monetary 
damages in addition to declaratory relief does not require a federal court 
automatically to apply the exceptional circumstances test articulated in 
Colorado River.”
193
  While noting the discretion afforded by the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, the court held that “a court may still abstain 
in a case in which a party seeks damages as well as a declaratory 
judgment so long as the further necessary or proper relief would be based 




Applying this rule to Royal Indemnity’s suit, the court reasoned that 
the claims for monetary damages could “all be characterized as ‘further 
necessary and proper relief’ that Royal Indemnity Company seeks based 
on the requested declaratory judgment.”
195
  Quoting and then parsing the 
language of the complaint’s prayer for relief, the court determined that 
“[i]f the district court were to reject Royal Indemnity Company’s claims 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, [Royal Indemnity Company] could 
not recover on the claims for contribution, subrogation, unjust 
enrichment and equitable estoppel.”
196
  These claims for nondeclaratory 
relief were therefore simply the logical result of any declaratory relief, 
making the declaratory relief the “essence of this lawsuit.”
197
 
D. The Fourth Approach: Brillhart/Wilton Applies Always and Only to 
Claims for Declaratory Relief 
This fourth and final approach is one that arguably the First Circuit 
has adopted, albeit this circuit has not expressly waded into the mixed-
complaint debate.
198




 have inferred 
                                                          
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Id. at 793–94. 
 195.  Id. at 794. 
 196.  Id.  
 197.  Id.; see also ITT Indus., Inc. v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 2d 552, 557 (E.D. Pa. 
2006) (applying the heart of the complaint rule and staying the case because it was at its essence a 
claim for declaratory relief).  The similarities between the jurisdictional-independence approach and 
the heart of the complaint rule should be immediately apparent.  The Seventh Circuit stated that its 
approach was similar to the “heart of the complaint” rule “except that the jurisdictional 
independence of the non-declaratory claims does not appear to be a consideration [in the heart of the 
complaint rule].”  R.R. Street & Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 711, 716 n.5 (7th Cir. 2009).  
This theoretical difference likely would have little impact in practice, but it is theoretically 
significant, as Part III explains. 
 198.  Given the lack of direct discussion of the mixed-complaint issue, one might fairly say that 
the First Circuit has never truly taken a position on this issue.  See Mass. Biologic Labs. of the Univ. 
of Mass. v. MedImmune, LLC, 871 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D. Mass. 2012) (“The First Circuit has not 
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this approach from First Circuit case law.  This approach seeks to 
separate—or disentangle—each claim, applying Colorado River to those 
seeking nondeclaratory relief while employing Brillhart/Wilton for those 
seeking declaratory relief. 
In Rossi v. Gemma,
201
 the First Circuit faced a procedurally 
convoluted case in which the plaintiffs challenged Rhode Island’s 
mechanic’s lien statute.
202
  While their initial challenge to the statute was 
pending before the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the plaintiffs filed a § 
1983 claim in federal court, seeking money damages, an injunction, and 
a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional.
203
  The district court 
abstained from hearing the federal claims under Colorado River and 




On appeal, the First Circuit decided to apply Younger abstention to 
the claims for nondeclaratory relief, to which the district court had 
applied Colorado River.
205
  Then, the court briefly observed that the 
district court had not needed to have found the Colorado River test met 
to abstain on the declaratory judgment claim because Brillhart/Wilton 
applied there, meaning that the district court enjoyed broad discretion on 
whether to abstain.
206
  The First Circuit never expressly described itself 
as resolving a mixed-complaint question, and in fact, the court appeared 
to have given no consideration to that issue.  But from its unhesitating 
application of Brillhart/Wilton to a claim for declaratory relief after 
having applied a different abstention doctrine to the claims for 
nondeclaratory relief, courts have interpreted Rossi as adopting a 
disentanglement or “surgical” approach.
207
 
                                                          
yet staked out a clear position on the circuit split . . . .”).  Nevertheless, other courts have found the 
First Circuit to have issued a controlling opinion, see, e.g., Seaton Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., 
736 F. Supp. 2d 472, 475 (D.R.I. 2010), and even the District of Massachusetts decided to follow the 
Rossi court’s approach because the First Circuit had “at least approved of, if not mandated” the 
“surgical” approach, see Mass. Biologic Labs., 871 F. Supp. 2d at 35.  Moreover, given that this 
position offers a fourth possible resolution to the mixed-complaint issue, it is included in this 
discussion as another alternative. 
 199.  See Seaton Ins. Co., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 475. 
 200.  See Mamone, supra note 16, at 364. 
 201.  Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 202.  Id. at 27–28.  
 203.  Id. at 28–32. 
 204.  Id. at 32–33. 
 205.  Id. at 34–38. 
 206.  Id. at 39. 
 207.  Teknor Apex Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., No. 12-417S, 2012 WL 6840498, at *2–3 
(D.R.I. Dec. 14, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 12-417S, 2013 WL 140416 (D.R.I. 
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These four approaches represent fundamentally different approaches 
to determining whether to apply the Colorado River doctrine or the 
Brillhart/Wilton doctrine to mixed-complaint cases.  Each approach has 
benefits; indeed, that is why federal courts of appeals have adopted each 
of these approaches.  Yet, as the next Part explains, the approaches are 
not, like men, created equal.
208
 
III. UNMIXING THE MESS BY GETTING TO THE HEART OF THE 
COMPLAINT 
The division among federal courts over how to handle abstention in 
mixed-complaint cases is obvious.  How to resolve this division is, at 
least at first glance, less clear.  On some level, each approach has 
intuitive appeal.  But ultimately, the heart of the complaint rule is the 
best rule. 
Reaching this conclusion requires developing criteria that 
appropriately weigh the strengths and weaknesses of each approach to 
mixed complaints within the context of America’s judicial system.  
These criteria must account for the language of the statutes and judicial 
decisions that govern abstention and jurisdiction, consider the wise use 
of judicial resources, and permit courts to decide cases fairly.  These 
concerns can be broken into four specific standards by which these 
approaches to mixed complaints can be measured: (1) preserving the 
discretionary language of the Declaratory Judgment Act while 
accounting for other jurisdictional statutes and the language of Colorado 
River; (2) promoting the wise use of judicial resources by ensuring that 
district courts have the necessary flexibility to manage their dockets 
wisely; (3) preventing plaintiffs from manipulating the judicial system by 
clever pleading; and (4) providing district courts the ability to reach the 
most just result given the particular facts of an individual case. 
This Part examines these four standards, explaining why each is an 
appropriate tool by which to measure approaches to mixed complaints, 
how each of the four approaches stands up under the scrutiny of each 
standard, and ultimately why the heart of the complaint rule is the best 
approach to mixed complaints under these standards. 
                                                          
Jan. 11, 2013). 
 208.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these Truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights . . . .”). 
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A. Preserving the Discretion Provided by the Declaratory Judgment Act 
First, whatever approach is adopted must preserve the discretion that 
Congress gave to federal courts in the Declaratory Judgment Act while 
accounting for other related statutes and judicial decisions.  Because 
Congress specifically granted courts discretion in the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, any resolution of the mixed-complaint question must 




The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a court “may declare the 
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”
210
  This 
statutory language is “unique[]” in the discretion it grants to federal 
courts.
211
  For example, federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.”
212
  Similarly, diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 states 
that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions” 
that meet certain, well-known criteria.
213
  Even statutes granting 
jurisdiction in more specific scenarios use similar language of “shall 
have original jurisdiction” to confer jurisdiction.
214
  These different types 
of jurisdictional grants, when read in conjunction with Supreme Court 
decisions like Chief Justice Marshall’s in Cohens, explain why courts 
have had to create abstention doctrines for cases brought under statutes 
like § 1331 or § 1332 but have been able to rely on the statutory 




Additionally, other statutes that use “may” do so to describe the 
                                                          
 209.  Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2615 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Whatever one thinks of the policy decision Congress 
made, it was Congress’ prerogative to make it.”). 
 210.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 211.  Royal Indem. Co. v. Apex Oil Co., 511 F.3d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Wilton v. 
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286–87 (1995)). 
 212.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 213.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (emphasis added).  These requirements include that the case 
involve more than $75,000 and that the parties be citizens of different states, among other things.  Id. 
§ 1332(a). 
 214.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1363 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action brought for the protection of jurors’ employment under section 1875 of this title.”). 
 215.  See Med. Assurance Co. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining why 
the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine is not a traditional abstention doctrine like Colorado River). 
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court in which a plaintiff can file suit, not to describe what the court is 
allowed to do, making them fundamentally inapposite from § 2201.
216
  
The type of “may” in these other provisions has been interpreted as 
permitting a plaintiff to bring a claim in federal court or in state court.  
For instance, when analyzing whether state courts had concurrent 
jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act,
217
 the Supreme Court reasoned that the 
statute “provides that suits of the kind described ‘may’ be brought in the 
federal district courts, not that they must be.”
218
  The Declaratory 
Judgment Act, by contrast, uses “may” in a way that gives courts latitude 
in whether to grant a certain type of relief. 
These differences in the language of statutes are clear enough, but 
the question that flows from recognizing these differences is what effect 
those differences should have.  In cases seeking only declaratory relief or 
only nondeclaratory relief, then the effect of the statutory language is 
obvious: Brillhart/Wilton applies to the claims for declaratory relief, and 
the appropriate judicially created abstention doctrine—such as Colorado 
River or Pullman—applies to the claims for nondeclaratory relief.  Yet 
when a complaint seeks both types of relief, the challenge for a court is 
how to give effect to the language Congress has adopted in various 
sections of Title 28 of the U.S. Code.  Giving effect to these grants is 
important because, as the Supreme Court recognized more than a century 
and half ago, Congress has the power to create inferior federal courts and 
to prescribe the scope of their jurisdiction.
219
  Thus, whatever jurisdiction 
Congress grants, courts should—indeed, must, unless an abstention 
                                                          
 216.  See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) (2012) (providing that a False Claims Act case “may be 
brought in any judicial district” meeting certain criteria).  
 217.  Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 
941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012)). 
 218.  Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 460–61 (1990) (quoting Charles Dowd Box Co. v. 
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962)). 
 219.  Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (“[I]t would seem to follow, also, that, having a 
right to prescribe, Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the 
enumerated controversies.  Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute 
confers.  No one of them can assert a just claim to jurisdiction exclusively conferred on another, or 
withheld from all.”); see also Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (“The Congressional 
power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power ‘of investing them with jurisdiction 
either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact 
degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.’” (quoting Cary v. 
Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845))); Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(observing that “only the Congress possesses authority to alter the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts” (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004))). 




—exercise as Congress granted. 
The heart of the complaint rule allows a court to exercise the 
discretion granted by Congress in § 2201 in a mixed-complaint case.
221
  
Under this rule, when a court determines that a complaint is, at its core, 
seeking declaratory relief, a court has the ability to decline to grant that 
relief.  Because the claims for nondeclaratory relief are tangential to the 
real issue in the case, a court that decides not to decide the case is doing 
no harm to the jurisdictional provisions of § 1331 or § 1332.  A case in 
federal court brought under either of those jurisdictional hooks would be 
heard (assuming Colorado River did not apply) if the case were really 
about those claims.  But when the core issue of the case is about 
declaratory relief, tacked-on claims for nondeclaratory relief that do not 
get decided by a federal court should raise no serious concerns that a 
court is flouting its obligation to exercise jurisdiction.  Indeed, the 
exceptions to the bright-line rule that the Fifth Circuit has adopted make 
this much clear.
222
  Thus, the heart of the complaint rule respects these 
jurisdictional statutes, so courts’ worries that the heart of the complaint 




Of the remaining approaches, the rule that Brillhart/Wilton never 
applies to mixed complaints most obviously ignores the language of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act by taking away that discretion.  It gives a 
court no opportunity to exercise the discretion over claims for 
declaratory relief that Congress granted.  As one federal district court has 
observed, “[t]o eradicate that discretion simply because a coercive claim 
has been tacked onto what is, at its core, a declaratory judgment action 
would be . . . to marginalize Wilton, and to undermine the statutory 
                                                          
 220.  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (“[Federal courts] have no more right to 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”). 
 221.  See, e.g., Columbia Gas of Pa. v. Am. Int’l Grp., No. 10-1131, 2011 WL 294520, at *2 
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011) (“In a ‘pure’ diversity matter, divorced from any interrelated declaratory 
claims, I would cleave to that obligation.  In a case such as this one, however, which implicates 
statutorily-granted discretion, other important principles are entitled to careful regard.”); ITT Indus., 
Inc. v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 2d 552, 557 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (“To apply the Colorado 
River standard to actions containing both declaratory judgment and coercive claims without an 
analysis of the facts at hand would be to ignore the Supreme Court’s specific recognition that 
declaratory judgment actions necessitate a different treatment than other types of cases.”); Martha A. 
Field, Removal Reform: A Solution for Federal Question Jurisdiction, Forum Shopping, and 
Duplicative State-Federal Litigation, 88 IND. L.J. 611, 665 (2013) (“If confined to cases in which 
only declaratory relief can be sought, the category of cases governed by Wilton is much reduced.”). 
 222.  See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 223.  Perelman v. Perelman, 688 F. Supp. 2d 367, 376 (E.D. Pa. 2010).  
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scheme established by Congress.”
224
  And as the Seventh Circuit said in 
rejecting this approach, “the mere fact that a litigant seeks some non-
frivolous, non-declaratory relief in addition to declaratory relief” should 
not obviate the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine.
225
  Indeed, this bright-line 
approach appears so myopically concerned with courts’ obligation to 
exercise their jurisdiction over claims for nondeclaratory relief absent the 
application of Colorado River that it ignores the equally legitimate 
discretion granted by Congress in § 2201.
226
 
The approach from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that 
Brillhart/Wilton applies only when claims for nondeclaratory relief are 
not jurisdictionally independent is only marginally better—although it 
preserves discretion in some cases, it removes discretion in other cases.  
Realistically, a court following the heart of the complaint rule and a court 
following the independent claim rule will likely reach similar 
conclusions, because if a case is truly about declaratory relief, then the 
claim for nondeclaratory relief is less likely to be independent, whereas a 
case that is about nondeclaratory relief at its core will likely have 
independent claims for that coercive relief.  Still, even if the difference in 
these approaches likely has little practical effect, the theoretical 
difference matters because it reflects how courts view constitutional 
structure.  Congress has the constitutional authority to create federal 
courts (other than the Supreme Court, of course
227
) and to establish their 
jurisdiction and obligations to decide (or not to decide) cases,
228
 so 




Finally, the First Circuit’s approach that the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine 
applies only to claims for declaratory relief fully respects Congress’s 
choices.  In fact, it does the best job of respecting all of the jurisdictional 
statutes that Congress has adopted.  It therefore does well under this 
                                                          
 224.  Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rolison, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1237 (S.D. Ala. 2006). 
 225.  R.R. Street & Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 226.  See, e.g., Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(“When a party seeks both injunctive and declaratory relief, the appropriateness of abstention must 
be assessed according to the doctrine of Colorado River; the only potential exception to this general 
rule arises when a party’s request for injunctive relief is either frivolous or is made solely to avoid 
application of the Brillhart standard.”). 
 227.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 228.  See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 229.  See, e.g., Wm. Grayson Lambert, Note, The Real Debate over the Senate’s Role in the 
Confirmation Process, 61 DUKE L.J. 1283, 1317–19 (2012) (discussing the importance of the rule of 
law in a democratic society). 
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standard for evaluating approaches to mixed complaints.  But this 
approach has other flaws that make it less desirable when evaluated 
under other standards. 
B. Promoting Wise Judicial Administration 
Judicial economy is constantly on the minds of federal judges.
230
  As 
one court succinctly described the need for efficiently managing its 
docket: “Every day of trial this Court can save, even every hour of trial it 
can save in one case permits the Court to hear the claim of another 
litigant.  This is of paramount importance and it is the essence of judicial 
economy.”
231
  Given the heavy caseload of federal courts and the time 
that it takes for cases to reach a resolution,
232
 federal judges 
understandably focus on judicial economy.  Any resolution of the circuit 
split over mixed complaints must therefore take into account the need for 
courts to manage their dockets efficiently.
233
 
The heart of the complaint rule promotes the wide judicial 
administration that is required for a well-functioning judiciary.
234
  It 
ensures that a court has sufficient flexibility to ensure that a case does 
not have to proceed unnecessarily because this approach has the 
“desirable feature[]” of “allow[ing] district courts to treat different cases 
differently based on the fundamental character of a particular action.”
235
  
As mixed-complaint cases involving abstention requests often arise in a 
context involving multiple lawsuits (that is, separate lawsuits filed in 
different courts; otherwise, the cases could simply be consolidated under 
                                                          
 230.  See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Constr. Laborers’ Pension Tr. v. M.M. Sundt Constr. Co., 37 F.3d 
1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Judicial economy is an important purpose of exhaustion requirements 
[for administrative remedies].” (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1968))); 
Barrington Grp., Ltd. v. Genesys Software Sys., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 870, 873 (E.D. Wis. 2003) 
(“Judicial economy is a particularly important concern when two actions involving the same parties 
and issues are pending in different districts.”). 
 231.  Goff v. Kroger Co., 647 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1986). 
 232.  See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, UNITED STATES COURTS (last visited Nov. 
19, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2014 
(providing an overview of the caseload of federal courts). 
 233.  Cf. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665 (1978) (“No one can seriously contend 
that a busy federal trial judge, confronted both with competing demands on his time for matters 
properly within his jurisdiction and with inevitable scheduling difficulties because of the 
unavailability of lawyers, parties, and witnesses, is not entrusted with a wide latitude in setting his 
own calendar.”). 
 234.  Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rolison, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1237 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (recognizing 
that the heart of the complaint rule promotes “wise judicial administration”). 
 235.  Id. at 1237–38. 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a)
236
), courts need the ability “to 
avert wasteful, duplicative declaratory litigation on exclusively state law 
issues in federal court running alongside parallel state litigation on the 
same issues, with concomitant disruption to the time-honored values of 
federalism, comity and efficiency” when the complaint does not truly 
present a case that warrants adjudication in federal court.
237
  By 
preserving a court’s authority to look at the core of a complaint, the heart 
of the complaint protects this need.
238
 
None of the other approaches ensures that federal courts can manage 
their dockets as wisely as the heart of the complaint rule.  First, the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits’ approach that forbids courts 
from applying the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine in mixed-complaint cases 
leaves little room for a court to consider judicial administration.  
Although judicial administration is central to the Colorado River 
analysis,
239
 the scope of that analysis is narrow compared to 
Brillhart/Wilton.
240
  Under this approach, if a plaintiff includes any claim 
seeking nondeclaratory relief in a complaint, the court cannot refrain 
from deciding the case, no matter the circumstance, unless Colorado 
                                                          
 236.  FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (“If actions before the court involve a common question of law or 
fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) 
consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”). 
 237.  Lexington Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1237; see also Coltec Indus. Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 
No. CIV.A. 04-5718, 2005 WL 1126951, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2005) (“The course we follow 
enables district courts to conserve their resources by staying a case that would duplicate state 
litigation.”). 
 238.  Lexington Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (“If peripheral monetary claims could deprive 
district courts of the discretion granted them by the Declaratory Judgment Act to hear or not to hear 
what are fundamentally declaratory judgment actions, then such claims would render federal courts 
virtually powerless (save for the rare case in which Colorado River abstention is warranted) to avert 
wasteful, duplicative declaratory litigation on exclusively state law issues in federal court running 
alongside parallel state litigation on the same issues, with concomitant disruption to the time-
honored values of federalism, comity and efficiency.”); Coltec, 2005 WL 1126951, at *3 (“Professor 
Chemerinsky has stressed the important reality that this duplication can squander judicial resources 
‘because ultimately only one of the jurisdictions will actually decide the case.  Once one court 
renders a ruling, the other court will be obliged to halt its proceedings and give res judicata effect to 
the decision.’” (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 14.1, at 839 (4th ed. 
2003))). 
 239.  See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (quoting 
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976)). 
 240.  Chase Brexton Health Servs., Inc. v. Maryland, 411 F.3d 457, 463 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n 
assessing whether Colorado River abstention is appropriate, a district court must remain mindful that 
this form of abstention ‘is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to 
adjudicate a controversy properly before it’ and that ‘[a]bdication of the obligation to decide cases 
can be justified under [abstention] only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the 
parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.’” (second 
and third alterations in original) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813)). 




  Thus, no matter how duplicative the case, a 
federal judge must hear it except for the most limited of circumstances—
the judge cannot save a day or an hour to devote to other cases.
242
 
Ironically, this approach that elevates Colorado River undermines 
one of that doctrine’s primary purposes.  The Supreme Court based its 
decision in Colorado River on “wise judicial administration.”
243
  
Brillhart/Wilton actually provides a court with far more flexibility to 
make decisions that promote such administration.  Granted, the Court in 
Colorado River also emphasized the limited circumstances under which 
courts could decline to exercise jurisdiction.
244
  But that concept is based 
on the idea that federal courts have been granted jurisdiction to decide 
certain types of cases and that courts have a duty to perform the tasks 
assigned to them.
245
  When a case includes a claim for declaratory relief, 
Congress has expressly given courts broader leeway in deciding whether 
to decide the case, a point that the rigid approach that always requires the 
application of Colorado River ignores.
246
  Of course, a mixed complaint 
also contains claims for nondeclaratory relief, for which courts have less 
discretion to abstain, which might favor the rule applying 
Brillhart/Wilton to claims for declaratory relief only.  The heart of the 
complaint rule, however, does not undermine the “rule” that federal 
courts should exercise jurisdiction.
247
  Rather, its application simply 
ensures that a plaintiff cannot cleverly plead his way into federal court by 
taking advantage of Colorado River.
248
 
Next, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ approach that allows the 
application of Brillhart/Wilton only when claims for nondeclaratory 
relief are jurisdictionally independent guarantees too little discretion to 
                                                          
 241.  See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (“To eradicate that discretion simply 
because a coercive claim has been tacked onto what is, at its core, a declaratory judgment action 
would be to jettison those same considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration [and] 
to exalt form over substance . . . .”). 
 242.  See Goff v. Kroger Co., 647 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (“Every day of trial this 
Court can save, even every hour of trial it can save in one case permits the Court to hear the claim of 
another litigant.”). 
 243.  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 818. 
 244.  Id. at 813–14. 
 245.  See id. at 813–16 (describing the various bases for abstention). 
 246.  See supra notes 210–18 and accompanying text (comparing the texts of permissive and 
mandatory congressional grants of jurisdiction). 
 247.  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813. 
 248.  See infra Part III.C; see also Kelly Inv., Inc. v. Cont’l Common Corp., 315 F.3d 494, 497 
n.4 (5th Cir. 2002) (providing an exception to the bright-line rule when a claim for nondeclaratory 
relief was “added . . . solely as a means of defeating Brillhart”). 
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ensure that courts can wisely manage their dockets.  Although in practice 
this test may function similarly to the heart of the complaint rule, again, 
the theoretical differences matter.  Not applying Brillhart/Wilton simply 
because some claims for nondeclaratory relief have their own 
jurisdictional hook still leaves the hypothetical situation in which a court 
is left convinced that it should not decide a case but left with no choice 
but to decide it. 
Finally, the First Circuit’s approach that permits courts to apply 
Brillhart/Wilton only to claims for declaratory relief leaves a federal 
court in essentially the same position as the approach that says 
Brillhart/Wilton never applies to mixed-complaint cases.  When the 
Brillhart/Wilton applies to claims for declaratory relief only, the federal 
court can apply the more lenient standard of that doctrine to some claims, 
but then it is left to apply Colorado River to the claims for 
nondeclaratory relief.  Hence, unless those more stringent requirements 
were met, the court would still be forced to adjudicate a case that it 
otherwise believes should not be heard in federal court, but, with only 
Colorado River as a basis to abstain, it cannot do so. 
C. Preventing Procedural Gamesmanship 
Another important concern is the need to prevent procedural 
gamesmanship.  Courts have repeatedly rejected litigants’ attempts to 
manipulate the judicial system.
249
  Indeed, “[n]o rational judicial system 
can tolerate manipulation.”
250
  Courts must have rules that they can 
enforce without litigants finding loopholes to avoid the result that a rule 
clearly contemplates.
251
  Moreover, procedural gamesmanship opens the 
metaphorical door for duplicative litigation and conflicting judicial 
orders, which benefits no one but the manipulator (assuming the 
manipulator’s plan works outs as expected) and only undermines the 
                                                          
 249.  See, e.g., McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 684 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(“Outland finally raised the choice of law issue only as this litigation approached the two-year mark 
and after it had lost on the merits under Illinois law.  We do not condone such procedural 
gamesmanship.”); Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 547–48 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that a state or its political subdivision cannot remove a case filed in state court to federal court and 
then invoke the state-litigation requirement of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), to contend that the case is not ripe).  
 250.  Newark Motor Inn Corp. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 77-582, 1980 WL 1875, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 1, 1980). 
 251.  Cf. Ferris v. Cuevas, 118 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) (interpreting a previous decision so 
as to have that case “not provide a loophole for attorney-plaintiffs . . . to manipulate the judicial 
system”). 
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sound administration of justice.
252
 
This issue focuses on preventing litigants from pleading a case in 
such a way that a court is required to apply one abstention doctrine over 
another, simply because of how a case is pled instead of based on the 
merits of the case.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only “a 
short and plain statement of the claim.”
253
  The purpose of this notice 
pleading is to avoid the technical pleading formalities of bygone eras.
254
  
Consistent with this principle, litigants should not have to draft 
complaints that meet overly technical requirements to get a case heard in 
court.  But at the same time, they should not be able to draft a complaint 
artfully (or craftily) to avoid unfavorable but should-be-applicable legal 
rules. 
The heart of the complaint rule does the best job of preventing 
litigants from manipulating the judicial system.  Under this rule, a court 
is not bound by the formalities of a pleading because the court can 
examine the complaint to determine what the real issue of the case is and 
what type of relief is central to the case.  Thus, a plaintiff cannot insert a 
claim for nondeclaratory relief into a complaint to avoid Brillhart/Wilton 
and instead be subject to Colorado River.
255
  The heart of the complaint 
rule therefore ensures that a court has the flexibility to apply whichever 
standard is appropriate in any given case. 
Again, the approach of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits 
is particularly troublesome in this context.  Although some of these 
courts have carved out an exception for “frivolous” claims for 
nondeclaratory relief,
256
 this exception fails to address sufficiently the 
obvious problem with this approach: a plaintiff can simply “toss[]” in a 
claim for nondeclaratory relief and preclude the application of 
Brillhart/Wilton doctrine.
257
  Finding a nonfrivolous claim should not be 
too challenging for most lawyers, particularly if the standard for 
                                                          
 252.  See, e.g., Columbia Gas of Pa. v. Am. Int’l Grp., No. 10-1131, 2011 WL 294520, at *2 
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011) (“Duplicative litigation, and the potential for different outcomes in 
different courts, is undesirable for apparent reasons.”). 
 253.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 254.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous 
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . .”); Venn-Severin Mach. 
Co. v. John Kiss Sons Textile Mills, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 4, 5 (D.N.J. 1941) (“[The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure] employ simplicity, conciseness and directness and technical forms are eschewed.”). 
 255.  Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Andrew Chevrolet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 (E.D. Wis. 
2008) (describing the benefits of the heart of the complaint rule). 
 256.  Kelly Inv., Inc. v. Cont’l Common Corp., 315 F.3d 494, 497 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 257.  Riley v. Dozier Internet Law, PC, 371 F. App’x 399, 404 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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“frivolous” in this context is akin to the standard of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11.
258
  As one district court colorfully put it, “it would be the 
tail wagging the dog if the presence of a subordinate claim were 
sufficient to require a federal court to hear primary claims that it has 
determined are better resolved elsewhere.”
259
  This rule would 
“encourage abuses, as savvy litigants would recognize that creative 
pleading of tagalong coercive claims in tandem with declaratory 
judgment claims was a surefire means of circumventing Wilton and 
preserving a federal forum, notwithstanding parallel state 
proceedings.”
260
  If a court applied this approach, a litigant would not 
have to be particularly clever to work a claim for nondeclaratory relief 
into the complaint to avoid Brillhart/Wilton.  Litigants would, in 
practice, find evading Brillhart/Wilton “far too easy.”
261
 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ jurisdictional-independence 
approach, given its functional similarity to the heart of the complaint 
rule, should provide some limits on creative pleading.  It requires a 
plaintiff to be able to state a claim for nondeclaratory relief over which a 
federal court would have jurisdiction independent of the claim for 
declaratory relief.  But this approach is still “too inflexible.”
262
  Creative 
pleading is not that hard for even decent lawyers.  Thus, although this 
approach is a step in the right direction, it ultimately falls short in fully 
preventing litigants from manipulative pleadings. 
Lastly, the surgical approach of the First Circuit also fails to prevent 
a potential gamesmanship.  Under this approach, a court could decide not 
to hear the claims for declaratory relief, but if the plaintiff included 
claims for nondeclaratory relief, then the court is left having to exercise 
jurisdiction over the case unless the court could abstain under Colorado 
River.  Given the narrowness of Colorado River abstention, a court may 
be forced to exercise jurisdiction over the claims for nondeclaratory 
relief.  If the court is required to hear the case, then a plaintiff may well 
have achieved whatever strategic advantage the plaintiff sought by filing 
a case in federal court, even if the claim for declaratory relief will not be 
                                                          
 258.  See, e.g., Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en 
banc) (“The word ‘frivolous’ does not appear anywhere in the text of the Rule; rather, it is a 
shorthand that this court has used to denote a filing that is both baseless and made without a 
reasonable and competent inquiry.” (emphasis added)). 
 259.  Franklin Commons E. P’ship v. Abex Corp., 997 F. Supp. 585, 592 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 260.  Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rolison, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1237 (S.D. Ala. 2006).  
 261.  Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Andrew Chevrolet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 (E.D. Wis. 
2008). 
 262.  Id. 
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decided.  Thus, although all gamesmanship in this area typically involves 
multiple judicial systems, the gamesmanship to which this particular 
approach is subject is particularly problematic in this regard: this 
approach deals effectively with keeping a court from being forced to 
decide a claim for declaratory relief, but it does not keep a plaintiff from 
using a case in federal court as part of a larger plan, in conjunction with a 
case in a state court, to manipulate litigation (broadly defined) against a 
particular defendant. 
D. Providing Flexibility to Reach a Just Result 
A fourth consideration in determining how best to handle mixed-
complaint cases is the need to provide federal courts with the necessary 
flexibility to reach just results.  Indeed, reaching a just result in each case 
is paramount.
263
  Given the importance of reaching the correct result in 
each case, courts need an approach to mixed-complaint cases that does 
not unnecessarily hinder their ability to reach the result they determine is 
correct on the particular facts of a case. 
The heart of the complaint rule guarantees this flexibility, which is 
one feature of it that has drawn many district courts to adopt it.
264
  The 
heart of the complaint rule is a fact-driven approach that ensures a court 
can cut to the core of a complaint’s allegations and apply the rule—either 
Brillhart/Wilton or Colorado River—that is more appropriate for the 
case.  In other words, the court has the latitude to apply the doctrine that 
will reach whatever the court believes is the just result.  This is not to 
suggest that a court will (or should) torture the analysis to reach the 
result that the court wants.
265
  Instead, the idea is that the court has the 
flexibility to reach what should be the legally correct and just result.
266
  
                                                          
 263.  See Wm. Grayson Lambert, Focusing on Fulfilling the Goals: Rethinking How Choice-of-
Law Regimes Approach Statutes of Limitations, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 491, 501 (2015) (“Deciding 
cases accurately is one of the most important jobs that a court has.”). 
 264.  See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1237–38 (“One of the most desirable 
features of the ‘heart of the action’ rule is its flexibility, as it allows district courts to treat different 
cases differently based on the fundamental character of a particular action.”); ITT Indus., Inc. v. Pac. 
Emp’rs Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 2d 552, 557 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (“The Court finds that the considerations 
underlying the decisions in Colorado River and Wilton regarding a district court’s obligation to 
exercise jurisdiction over an action are better served by the fact-driven ‘heart of the matter’ approach 
than the application of a bright-line rule.”).  
 265.  Cf. Lambert, supra note 229, at 1293–94 (discussing the view of law that sees no difference 
between law and political views).  
 266.  Someone who devotedly follows this no-distinction view (which is essentially a version of 
legal realism, cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)) 
will reject the idea that a “legally correct” result exists.  But this person should also believe that a 
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Ultimately, federal judges must be trusted to apply the law faithfully;
267
 
otherwise, the entire federal judiciary would face far greater problems 
than whether courts were properly dealing with mixed-complaint cases. 
Of course, too much flexibility can be a problem, either because the 
standards are too amorphous to be meaningful or because the standards 
are too difficult to apply.  In the one other article addressing this topic, 
the proposed solution—applying a different approach based on the type 
of case, such as insurance litigation, securities litigation, or arbitration-
related litigation
268
—suffers from this second problem.  Having a 
different approach for each type of substantive claim not only would 
prove complicated in practice, as courts and litigants would have to keep 
straight these varying standards,
269
 but also would require courts 
constantly to be addressing new types of cases to decide what approach 
applied to those claims.  Moreover, this answer to the mixed-complaint 
question focuses solely on the underlying substance of a case, not the 
four systemic concerns that every mixed-complaint case raises and that 
are the basis of the analysis here. 
This flexibility that the heart of the complaint rule provides does not, 
as the Fourth Circuit suggested, “deprive a plaintiff of access to a federal 
forum simply because he sought declaratory relief in addition to an 
injunction or money damages.”
270
  A court would only abstain, even 
under Brillhart/Wilton, if a moving party proved that abstention was 
appropriate. Brillhart/Wilton does not provide some trump card to keep a 
court from hearing a case that should be heard, which is what the Fourth 




Ultimately, the heart of the complaint rule is neither amorphous nor 
complicated.  It is simple to apply: a court examines a case to determine 
whether, at its core, the case is about declaratory or nondeclaratory relief, 
and then the court applies the appropriate abstention doctrine.  Although 
                                                          
court will reach its desired result no matter the legal rule, so the legal framework is presumably 
unimportant (or at least less important) to this person, which means this entire Article is something 
that person would see as nothing but a pointless academic exercise. 
 267.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (providing the oath for federal judges). 
 268.  See Mamone, supra note 16, at 368–75 (arguing that a single test is unwise because of the 
nature of abstention and the uniqueness of each case). 
 269.  Although courts and litigants should ultimately be able to keep these standards straight, it 
would prove far more time consuming than having a single standard. 
 270.  vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, 781 F.3d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 271.  See id. (“We decline to adopt a rule that would transform that thoroughness [of including 
claims for both declaratory and nondeclaratory relief] into a handicap.”). 
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some cases may be debatable at what the core of the case seeks, such 
disagreement is possible with virtually any legal rule that is not an 
absolute rule.
272
  This room for disagreement does not make the heart of 
the complaint rule too mushy to apply meaningfully or too complicated 
to apply accurately. 
As with the previous three standards for evaluating these approaches, 
the other approaches to mixed-complaint cases fall short.  Starting with 
the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits’ bright-line approach, a 
court has no flexibility: it must apply Colorado River.  Thus, even if a 
court believed not exercising jurisdiction was the right answer, the court 
would be required to exercise jurisdiction unless the “stringent” standard 
of Colorado River is met.
273
  This lack of flexibility suggests one of two 
outcomes when a court should not exercise jurisdiction over a mixed-
complaint case: either the court will faithfully apply Colorado River and 
exercise jurisdiction over the case despite any well-founded misgivings 
or the court will contort the Colorado River analysis to abstain.  Neither 
result is desirable. 
What this approach does offer, of course, is a clear rule.
274
  Such 
bright-line approaches are certainly beneficial in some respects.
275
  For 
example, they “foster consistency throughout the courts and because they 
alert parties to what is allowed and what is not in the eyes of the law.”
276
  
Although bright-line rules are often preferable because they provide 
more predictability for courts and litigants,
277
 bright-line rules can also 
lead to more unpalatable results,
278
 particularly in issues that can be as 
fact-intensive as mixed-complaint cases.  Given the fact-intensive nature 
of a mixed-complaint case and the fact that these cases, while important, 
                                                          
 272.  Recall that even the Fifth Circuit has adopted exceptions to its bright-line rule for mixed 
complaints. 
 273.  Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289–90 (1988). 
 274.  See Mamone, supra note 16, at 364 (noting how this approach provides a bright-line rule to 
the problem of mixed complaints). 
 275.  Field, supra note 221, at 611 (“Federal court procedural, especially jurisdictional ones, 
need to be governed by clear, effective, and fair rules.”). 
 276.  Christopher Bingham Galligan, Case Summary, FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals 677 F.3d 
1298 (11th Cir. 2012), 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 491, 506 (2013); cf. Arizona v. 
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1988) (discussing the benefits of a bright-line rule in criminal 
procedure). 
 277.  See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 263, at 530–34 (arguing that a clear rule is important in 
determining which statute of limitations applies in a choice-of-law regime). 
 278.  Cf. Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(“There are several such bright line limitations on federal removal jurisdiction (e.g. the removal bar 
for in-state defendants and the one year time limit for diversity removals) that some might regard as 
arbitrary and unfair.”). 
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do not yet threaten to overwhelm federal courts’ dockets, providing 
flexibility for courts to get the answer right outweighs the benefits of a 
bright-line rule in this particular situation. 
Next, as for the Seventh and Ninth Circuit’s approach, it provides 
flexibility only when claims for nondeclaratory relief have no 
independent jurisdictional basis.  Given the potential for creative 
pleading,
279
 this standard could leave courts often facing a situation in 
which a plaintiff has found a jurisdictional hook for a claim for 
nondeclaratory relief, leaving the court unable to apply Brillhart/Wilton 
and unable to abstain under Colorado River, despite having the firm 
conviction that not deciding the case is the better option.
280
 
And finally, as for the First Circuit’s approach, this rule gives a court 
flexibility to deal with the claim for declaratory relief, but it still leaves a 
court having to apply Colorado River when evaluating the claims for 
nondeclaratory relief.  Of course, those claims are premised on 
jurisdictional statutes
281
 that do not provide the flexibility of 28 U.S.C. § 
2201, but when concerns about procedural gamesmanship are frequently 
at the center of a court’s thinking,
282
 being left to apply Colorado River 
may still allow a litigant to keep a case in federal court when practical 
considerations suggest that is not the proper outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of these four approaches to mixed complaints has some 
rationale foundation.  Each has some benefits.  Each has some 
drawbacks.  But ultimately, the heart of the complaint approach “is the 
most appropriate and the most readily reconcilable with applicable legal 
principles.”
283
  Given the array of concerns facing courts, this approach 
best strikes the balance of preserving the unique language that Congress 
used in § 2201, promoting the wise use of judicial resources, preventing 
manipulation of litigation, and providing courts the needed flexibility for 
                                                          
 279.  See supra Part III.C (discussing the possibilities of procedural gamesmanship). 
 280.  Columbia Gas of Pa. v. Am. Int’l Grp., No. 10-1131, 2011 WL 294520, at *2 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 27, 2011) (“[T]he ‘independent claim’ approach, which will often—and likely would, in this 
case—result in an unsought, de facto severance or bifurcation of related claims between state and 
federal fora, is also unsatisfactory.”). 
 281.  In most cases, these claims would be based on either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text. 
 282.  Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rolison, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1237–38 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (discussing 
the need for a rule that allows a court to confront attempts to manipulate litigation). 
 283.  Id. at 1237. 
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reaching the correct result.  As instances of mixed complaints are likely 
to rise as judicial caseloads get larger, courts must have a rule that allows 
them to deal with these cases fairly and efficiently.  The heart of the 
complaint approach is that rule. 
 
